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Abstract—In this paper, we study the impacts of transmit an-
tenna selection on the secrecy performance of massive MIMO
systems. We consider a wiretap setting in which a fixed number
of transmit antennas are selected and then confidential messages
are transmitted over them to a multi-antenna legitimate receiver
while being overheard by a multi-antenna eavesdropper. For this
setup, we derive an accurate approximation of the instantaneous
secrecy rate. Using this approximation, it is shown that in
some wiretap settings under antenna selection the growth in the
number of active antennas enhances the secrecy performance of
the system up to some optimal number and degrades it when
this optimal number is surpassed. This observation demonstrates
that antenna selection in some massive MIMO settings not
only reduces the RF-complexity, but also enhances the secrecy
performance. We then consider various scenarios and derive
the optimal number of active antennas analytically using our
large-system approximation. Numerical investigations show an
accurate match between simulations and the analytic results.
Index Terms—Massive MIMO wiretap channel, physical layer
security, transmit antenna selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the popularity of smart phones,
electronic tablets and video streaming as well as the sharp
rise in the number of service providers has led to an explosive
growth of data traffic in wireless networks. This increasing
demand of capacity in mobile broadband communications
poses challenges for designing the next generation of cellular
networks (5G) in the near future [2]. Given this backdrop,
confidential and private transmission of data in the next gener-
ation of wireless networks is of paramount importance. In this
respect, physical layer security for 5G wireless networks has
gained significant attentions in recent years aiming for design
of reliable and secure transmission schemes [3], [4]. Unlike
the traditional approaches relying on cryptographic techniques
[5], physical layer security provides secrecy by exploiting the
inherent characteristics of wireless channels. Although crypto-
graphic techniques employed in the upper layers of networks
protect processed data securely, physical layer security is a
potential solution through the communication phase [6].
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The basic model for physical layer security is the wiretap
channel in which transmitted messages to a legitimate receiver
are being overheared by an eavesdropper. Wyner demonstrated
that secrecy is obtained in this setting as long as the legitimate
receiver communicates over a channel whose quality is better
than the eavesdropper channel [7]. Based on this framework,
several techniques such as artificial noise generation [8], [9]
and cooperative jamming [10] were proposed for secrecy en-
hancement. The extension of Wyner’s framework to Multiple-
Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) settings has moreover shown
a promising performance of such settings in the presence of
eavesdroppers [11]–[13]. In fact, in MIMO wiretap channels,
also referred to as Multiple-Input Multiple-Output Multiple-
Eavesdropper (MIMOME) channels, the Base Station (BS)
can focus its main transmit beam to the legitimate terminals,
and thus, reduce the information leakage to the eavesdroppers.
This technique in massive MIMO settings [14] asymptotically
cancels out passive malicious terminals in the network making
these settings robust against passive eavesdropping [15].
Despite promising characteristics of massive MIMO sys-
tems, they are known to pose high Radio Frequency (RF)-cost
and complexity. In fact, employing a separate RF chain per
antenna in massive MIMO systems imposes a burden from the
implementational point of view [16]. This issue has introduced
the antenna selection [17] along with other approaches such
as spatial modulation [18] and hybrid analog-digital precoding
schemes [19], [20] as prevalent strategies in massive MIMO.
In antenna selection, only a subset of antennas is set to be ac-
tive in each coherence time. This subset is in general selected
with respect to some performance metric such as achievable
transmission rate, outage probability or bit error rate [17]. The
optimal approaches to antenna selection however deal with
an exhaustive search which is not computationally feasible
in practice. Alternatively, several suboptimal, but complexity
efficient, methods have been proposed in the literature; see
for example the approaches in [21]–[24]. The investigations
have shown that these suboptimal approaches do not impose a
significant loss on the performance for several MIMO settings
[23], [25], [26]. In the context of massive MIMO systems,
recent studies have demonstrated that the large-system prop-
erties of these systems are maintained even via simple antenna
selection algorithms [27], [28].
In addition to implementational complexity reduction, an-
tenna selection was also observed to be beneficial in MIMO
systems with respect to some performance measures such as
secrecy rate [29], [30], energy efficiency [31] and effective
rate [32] in some special cases. For instance, it was shown in
[33] that single Transmit Antenna Selection (TAS), i.e., only
one trannsmit antenna being active, in a conventional MIMO
setup can achieve high levels of security, especially when
the total number of transmit antennas increases. The study
was later extended in [34] to cases with multi-antenna eaves-
droppers demonstrating that similar results hold also in these
settings. In [35], secure transmission in a general MIMOME
channel was investigated under single TAS. Such results were
further extended in the literature for other MIMOME settings.
For example in [36], secure transmission was studied for
Nakagami-m fading channels under single TAS. The impacts
of imperfect channel estimation and antenna correlation were
also investigated in [37]. The average secrecy rate and secrecy
diversity analysis for a simple single TAS scheme was more-
over studied in [38], [39]. In [40], TAS with outdated Channel
State Information (CSI) was analyzed for scenarios with
single-antenna receivers. The effect of single TAS at the BS in
the presence of randomly located eavesdroppers with a full-
duplex receiver was moreover studied in [41]. In contrast to
single TAS, the secrecy performance of MIMOME channels
under the multiple TAS, i.e., setting multiple transmit antennas
to be active, has not yet been addressed in the literature.
In fact under multiple TAS, the growth in the number of
transmit antennas is beneficial to both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper, and therefore, its effect on the overall
secrecy performance is not clear. This paper intends to study
the impact of multiple TAS in massive MIMOME settings.
Contributions and Organization
We study the secrecy performance of a MIMOME channel
in which the BS employs a computationally simple TAS algo-
rithm to select a fixed number of transmit antennas. For this
setting, the distribution of the instantaneous secrecy rate in the
large-system limit, i.e., when the number of transmit antennas
grows large, is accurately approximated. This approximation
is then utilized to investigate the secrecy performance in two
different scenarios: Scenario (A) in which the eavesdropper’s
CSI is available at transmit side, and Scenario (B) in which the
BS does not know the eavesdropper’s CSI. Our investigations
demonstrate that in both scenarios, there exist cases in which
the secrecy performance is optimized when the number active
antennas are less than the total number of transmit antennas.
In other words, the growth in the number of selected antennas
in some cases enhances the secrecy performance up to an op-
timal value; however, it becomes destructive if the number of
the active antennas surpasses this optimal value. Invoking our
large-system results, we develop a framework to derive analy-
tically this optimal value. The consistency of our approach is
then confirmed through numerical investigations.
The remaining parts of this manuscript is structured as foll-
ows: Section II describes the system model. In Section III, we
conduct analyses for large dimensions. The impacts of TAS on
the secrecy performance is investigated in Section IV where
we also give some numerical results and discussions. Finally,
the concluding remarks are given in Section VI. The proofs of
the main theorems are moreover provided in the appendices.
Notations: Throughout the paper, scalars, vectors and matri-
ces are denoted by non-bold, bold lower case, and bold upper
case letters, respectively. C represents the complex plain. The
Hermitian of H is indicated with HH, and IN is the N ×N
identity matrix. The determinant of H and Euclidean norm
of x are shown by |H| and ‖x‖, respectively. ⌊x⌉ refers to
the integer with minimum Euclidean distance from x. The
binary and natural logarithm are denoted by log (·) and ln (·),
respectively, and 1{·} represents the indicator function. E {·}
is the mathematical expectation, and Q(x) and φ(x) denote
the standard Q-function and the zero-mean and unit-variance
Gaussian distribution, respectively.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a Gaussian MIMOME wiretap setting in which
the transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
are equipped with multiple antennas represented by M , Nr
and Ne, respectively. The main channel, from the transmitter
to the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper channel, from
the transmitter to the eavesdropper, are assumed to be statisti-
cally independent and experience quasi-static Rayleigh fading.
The CSI of the both channels are considered to be available at
the receiving terminals. The transmitter is moreover assumed
to know the CSI of the main channel. In practice, the CSI is
obtained at the respective terminals by performing channel es-
timation which depends on the duplexing mode of the system.
Massive MIMO settings are usually considered to operate in
the time division duplexing mode in which it is sufficient to
estimate the channel only in the uplink training mode due to
the channel reciprocity. More details on channel estimation in
massive MIMO settings are found in [42, Chapter 3]. Based
on the availability of the eavesdropper’s CSI at the transmitter,
we consider two different scenarios in this paper:
(A) The eavesdropper’s CSI is available at the transmitter.
(B) The transmitter does not know the eavesdropper’s CSI.
A. System Model
The encoded message xM×1 is transmitted over the main
channel. In this case, the received signal yNr×1 reads
y =
√
ρm Hmx+ nm (1)
where Hm∈CNr×M represents the main channel matrix, ρm
denotes the average Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) at each re-
ceive antenna and nm is zero-mean and unit-variance complex
Gaussian noise, i.e., nm ∼ CN (0, INr). Since the channel
is assumed to be quasi-static Rayleigh fading, the coherence
time is significantly larger than the transmission interval and
entries of Hm are modeled as independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) complex-valued Gaussian random variables
with zero-mean and unit-variance.
At the eavesdropper, x is overheard and the signal
z =
√
ρe Hex+ ne (2)
is received where He∈CNe×M is the eavesdropper channel
matrix enclosing the fading coefficients between the transmit
and eavesdropper’s antennas. The entries if He are modeled
as i.i.d. complex-valued Gaussian random variables with zero-
mean and unit-variance, since the channel experiences quasi-
static Rayleigh fading. ne ∼ CN (0, INe) represents additive
white Gaussian noise at the eavesdropper and ρe denotes the
average SNR at each of the eavesdropper’s antennas. While
both the receiving terminals utilize all their available antennas,
the transmitter employs the TAS protocol S to select a subset
of its antennas. The protocol is illustrated in the following.
TAS Protocol: Let hℓ,m∈CNr represent the ℓ-th column vector
ofHm and L be the number of transmit antennas desired to be
selected. Denote the index set of columns sorted with respect
to their magnitudes by W := {w1, . . . , wM} such that
‖hw1,m‖ ≥ ‖hw2,m‖ ≥ · · · ≥ ‖hwM ,m‖. (3)
The TAS protocol S selects L antennas which correspond to
the first L indices in W, i,e., WS := {w1, . . . , wL}.
Corresponding to the TAS protocol, the effective main and
eavesdropper channel, namely H˜m and H˜e, are respectively
constructed fromHm andHe by collecting those column vec-
tors which correspond to the selected antennas. For instance,
H˜m is an Nr × L matrix with columns hw1,m, . . . ,hwL,m.
Note that although the TAS protocol S selects the strongest
antennas corresponding to the main channels, it performs as
a random TAS protocol for the eavesdropper, since Hm and
He are statistically independent.
Remark: In practice, WS in the TAS protocol can be deter-
mined either by employing a rate-limited feedback channel
from the legitimate receiver to the BS or by estimating the
CSI at the BS. One may note that in the former case, the
rate-limited channel requires a low overhead. Moreover, in the
latter case, the transmitter need not to acquire the complete
CSI. In fact, asWS is determined via the ordering in (3), the
transmitter only needs to estimate the channel norms. This
task can be done at the prior uplink stage simply by analog
power estimators, and requires a significantly reduced time
interval compared to the case of complete CSI estimation.
This reduced interval furthermore allows for averaging over
the coherence time which can improve the power estimation;
see [43] for more details.
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate
For the MIMOME wiretap setting specified by (1) and (2),
the instantaneous achievable secrecy rate reads [12]
Rs = [Rm −Re]+ (4)
where [x]+ = max {0, x}. In (4), Rm denotes the achievable
rate over the main channel which reads
Rm = log|I+ ρmHmQHHm| (5)
and Re is the achievable rate over the eavesdropper channel
which is given by
Re = log|I+ ρeHeQHHe | (6)
with QM×M being the power control matrix. For simplicity,
we assume uniform power allocation over active antennas with
unit average transmit power on each antenna. This means that
[Q]ww =
{
1 w ∈WS
0 w /∈WS . (7)
Consequently, the instantaneous rates Rm and Re reduce to
Rm = log|I+ ρmH˜HmH˜m| (8a)
Re = log|I+ ρeH˜He H˜e|. (8b)
Note that Re in (8b) is determined under the worst-case sce-
nario in which the eavesdropper knows the indices of antennas
selected by the protocol S. Substituting into (4), the maximum
achievable instantaneous secrecy rate reads
Rs (S) =
[
log
|I+ ρmH˜HmH˜m|
|I+ ρeH˜He H˜e|
]+
(9)
where the argument S is written to indicate the dependency
of the achievable secrecy rate on the TAS protocol. Note that
when the eavesdropping terminal is not capable of obtaining
the indices of the selected antennas, (9) bounds the achievable
instantaneous secrecy rate from below. Since the channels ex-
perience fading, Rs (S) is a random variable whose statistics
define different secrecy performance metrics, e.g., the ergodic
secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability. In the sequel, we
evaluate the asymptotic distribution of Rs (S).
III. LARGE-SYSTEM SECRECY PERFORMANCE
The secrecy performances in Scenarios A and B are quanti-
fied via different metrics. In Scenario A, since the BS knows
the eavesdropper’s CSI, it transmits with rate Rs (S) in each
coherence time; thus, the secrecy performance is measured by
the achievable ergodic secrecy rate. When the eavesdropper’s
CSI is not available at the BS, the transmitter assumes the
secrecy rate to be Ro. In this case, the secure transmission is
guaranteed as long as Rm−Re > Ro. Consequently, in Sce-
nario B, the secrecy performance is properly quantified by the
secrecy outage capacity; see [44] for further discussions.
Based on above discussions, the performance of the setting
in both Scenarios A and B is described by statistics of Rs(S).
We hence derive an accurate large-system approximation for
the distribution of Rs(S) in Theorem 1. Here by the large-
system limit we meanM ↑ ∞. To state Theorem 1, we define
the “asymmetrically asymptotic regime of eavesdropping”.
Definition 1 (asymmetrically asymptotic regime of eavesdrop-
ping): The eavesdropper is said to overhear in the asymmetri-
cally asymptotic regime of eavesdropping when the number of
eavesdropper’s antennas per active antenna, defined as βe :=
Ne/L, reads either βe ≪ 1 or βe ≫ 1.
In Definition 1, βe ≪ 1 describes scenarios in which the
eavesdropper is a regular mobile terminal with finite number
of antennas. Moreover, βe ≫ 1 represents MIMOME settings
with sophisticated eavesdropping terminals such as portable
stations in cellular networks. In the sequel, we assume that the
understudy setting operates in the asymmetrically asymptotic
regime of eavesdropping. However, our numerical investiga-
tions later depict that the results are valid even when the sys-
tem does not operate in this regime of eavesdropping.
Theorem 1: Consider the TAS protocol S, and let
ηt = Nr [L+MfNr+1(u)] (10a)
σ2t = (uL− ηt)2
(
1
L
− 1
M
)
− η
2
t
L
+ Ξt (10b)
for some non-negative real u which satisfies∫ ∞
u
fNr(x)dx =
L
M
, (11)
Ξt which is given by
Ξt := Nr (Nr + 1) [L+MfNr+1(u) +MfNr+2(u)] , (12)
and fNr(·) which represents the chi-square probability density
function with 2Nr degrees of freedom and mean Nr, i.e.,
fNr(x) =
1
(Nr − 1)!
{
xNr−1e−x, if x ≥ 0
0, if x < 0
. (13)
Define the integers Um := min {L,Nr}, Vm := max {L,Nr},
Ue := min {L,Ne} and Ve := max {L,Ne} and assume that
the eavesdropper overhears in the asymmetrically asymptotic
regime of eavesdropping. Then, as M grows large, the distri-
bution of the instantaneous secrecy rate Rs(S) is effectively
approximated by the distribution of Rasy(S) := [R⋆]+ where
R⋆ is Gaussian with mean η and variance σ2 given by
η :=Um log
(
Kt
Um
)
−Ctψ
2K2t
ρmηt−Ue log (1 + ρeVe) , (14a)
σ2 :=
([(
1− Ct
K2t
)
Umρmσt
Kt
]2
+1{Ne>L}
Ue
Ve
+ 1{Ne<L}
UeVeρ
2
e
(1 + ρeVe)
2
)
ψ2 (14b)
for Kt := Um + ρmηt and Ct := ρmηtUm (Um − 1) /Vm and
the constant ψ = log e = 1.4427.
Proof: The proof follows the hardening property of the main
and eavesdropper channel. In fact, the results of [28] indicate
that in the large-system limit, Rm is approximately Gaussian
with a vanishing variance. The eavesdropper channel is more-
over shown to harden in the asymmetrically asymptotic regi-
me of eavesdropping following the discussions in [45]. The
detailed derivations are given in Appendix A.
From (14b), one observes that the variance of the secrecy
rate vanishes in the large-system limit. In fact, as M grows
large, ηt increases, and hence, the first term in (14b) tends to
zero. Moreover, in the asymmetrically asymptotic regime of
eavesdropping, Ue/Ve is significantly small and the two other
terms are negligible. Consequently, in the large-system limit
σ converges to zero. This observation could be intuitively
predicted, due to the fact that the both channels harden asym-
ptotically. The mean value η, however, does not necessarily
increase as M grows, since it is given as the difference of
two terms which can both asymptotically grow large. The
latter observation indicates that increasing the number of
selected antennas for this setup does not necessarily improve
the secrecy rate. We discuss this argument later in Section IV.
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Fig. 1: The ergodic secrecy rate and its approximation versus the SNR of the
legitimate receiver for Nr = Ne = 2, L = 8, M = 16 and log ρe = −5
dB.
At this point, we employ Theorem 1 to investigate the secrecy
performance of the system in Scenarios A and B.
Remark: Theorem 1 gives a “large-system approximation”.
This means that for fixed L, Nr and Ne, Rasy(S) accurately
approximates the statistics of the instantaneous secrecy rate
when M is large enough. Note that the theorem does not
impose any constraint on the growth of L, Nr and Ne, and
the approximation is valid as long as the assumptions of the
theorem are fulfilled. Nevertheless, our numerical investiga-
tions show that even for M = 16, which is not so large, this
approximation is highly accurate.
A. Secrecy Performance in Scenario A
When the BS knows the eavesdropper’s CSI, the instanta-
neous secrecy rate is achievable in each transmission interval.
Assuming that the symbols of the given codeword observe dif-
ferent realizations of the channel, the maximum average rate
achieved by the transmitter is determined by the expectation
of the instantaneous secrecy rate. This average rate is referred
to as the achievable ergodic secrecy rate and is considered as
an effective performance metric in this case. Using Theorem
1, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate RErg (S) for our setup
in the large-system limit is approximated as
RErg (S) ≈ E {Rasy (S)} = E
{
[R⋆]+
}
= σ φ (ξ) + ηQ(−ξ) . (15)
where ξ := η/σ. Using the inequality Q(x) < φ (x)/x for
x > 0 and the fact that Q(−x) + Q(x) = 1, we can bound
the ergodic secrecy rate as
RErg (S) > η (16)
for ξ > 0. By numerical investigations, it is seen that the lower
bound is tight when ξ is large enough. Fig. 1 illustrates the
accuracy of the approximations, as well as the tightness of the
bound. The figure has been plotted for L = 8 and M = 16
transmit antennas which is practically small. The SNR at
the eavesdropping terminal is considered to be log ρe =
−5 dB and the receiving terminals have been assumed to
have Nr = Ne = 2 antennas. As the figure shows, the
approximation is consistent with the simulations within a large
range of SNRs. The lower bound in (16) moreover perfectly
matches RErg(S) except for the interval of ρm in which η
is close to zero. This observation is due to the fact that the
variance in the large-system limit tends to zero rapidly, and
thus, ξ = η/σ grows significantly large even for finite values
of η. Consequently, one can write Q(−ξ) ≈ 1 − φ(ξ)/ξ and
approximate the achievable ergodic rate with η accurately.
Although the approximation in Theorem 1 is given for the
large-system limit and asymmetrically asymptotic regime of
eavesdropping, one observes that the result is accurately con-
sistent with the simulations even for not so large dimensions
and βe = 1/8.
B. Secrecy Performance in Scenario B
In Scenario B, the eavesdropper’s CSI is not known at the
BS. This means that for a given realization of the channels, the
instantaneous secrecy rate in (4) cannot be achieved. This is
due to the fact that the transmitter achieves the secrecy rate in
(4) by constructing its codewords based on the leakage rate
achievable over the eavesdropper channel. For this scenario,
the ǫ-outage secrecy rate is known to be the proper metric
quantifying the secrecy performance. Considering a given rate
Ro ≥ 0 the secrecy outage probability POut (Ro) is [44]
POut (Ro) = Pr {Rs (S) < Ro} . (17)
Consequently, the ǫ-outage achievable secrecy rateROut (ǫ) is
defined as the maximum possible rate for which POut (Ro) ≤
ǫ. The intuition behind defining the ǫ-outage secrecy rate
as the performance metric can be stated as the following:
Since the BS does not know the CSI of the eavesdropper
channel, it assumes that the achievable secrecy rate is at least
Ro in all transmission intervals. Noting that the CSI of the
main channel is known at the BS, the setting of the secrecy
rate implicitly imposes this assumption on the quality of the
eavesdropper channel that Re < Rm − Ro in which the
term Rm−Ro is known by the transmitter. Consequently, the
secrecy outage probability in (17) determines the probability
of the eavesdropper having better channel quality than the
assumed term Rm − Ro, or equivalently, the fraction of
intervals in which the eavesdropper can decode transmit code-
words at least partially. As a result, ROut (ǫ) determines the
maximum achievable secrecy rate for which one can guarantee
that the fraction of transmission intervals with information be-
ing leaked to the eavesdropper is less than ǫ.
From Theorem 1, the outage probability is approximated as
POut (Ro) ≈Pr {Rasy (S) ≤ Ro} = Pr {R⋆ ≤ Ro}
= 1−Q
(Ro − η
σ
)
. (18)
Consequently, the ǫ-outage secrecy rate is given by
ROut (ǫ) = σQ−1 (1− ǫ) + η (19)
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with Q−1 (·) being the inverse of the Q-function with respect
to composition. Moreover, the probability of non-zero secrecy
rate PNZS, defined as PNZS := Pr {Rs (S) > 0}, in the large-
system limit is approximated as PNZS ≈ 1−Q(η/σ).
Fig. 2 shows the secrecy outage probability as a function
of ρm for Ro = 5 considering various values of Nr and L.
Here, Ne = 8 and log ρe = −10 dB and the BS is con-
sidered to be equ-ipped with M = 128 antennas. As it
is seen, the large-system approximation consistently tracks
the numerical result for a large range of SNRs. Although
Theorem 1 approximates the distribution of the instantaneous
secrecy rate in the asymmetrically asymptotic regime of
eavesdropping, one can see that the results closely match the
simulations even for βe = 1.
IV. SECRECY ENHANCEMENT VIA TAS
In this section, we investigate the impacts of TAS on the se-
crecy performance in both Scenarios A and B. Let us start
with Scenario A. As it was discussed, the secrecy performance
in this case is characterized by the ergodic secrecy rate whose
large-system approximation is given in Section III-A. Consid-
ering the ergodic secrecy rate RErg(S) as a function of L,
one observes that for different choices of ρe, ρm, Nr and Ne,
the ergodic secrecy rate may strictly increase with L within
the interval {1, . . . ,M} or have a maxima at some integer
L⋆ < M . This observation suggests that for the considered
setting the secrecy performance can be enhanced in some
cases via TAS. Fig. 3 illustrates this point. In this figure, the
ergodic secrecy rate is plotted as a function of L, for several
realizations of the setting with M = 128 considering both the
large-system approximation and numerical simulations. The
SNRs at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are set to
log ρm = 0 dB and log ρe = −10 dB, respectively. As the
figure shows, the ergodic secrecy rate in some curves meets its
maximum at some values of L which is significantly smaller
than M . This observation depicts that TAS in these scenarios,
not only benefits in terms of RF-cost and complexity, but also
enhances the secrecy performance of the system. The intuition
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behind this behavior comes from the fact that the growth in the
number of selected antennas improves the quality of the both
channels. For some cases, including those shown in Fig. 3, the
improvement from the eavesdropper’s point of view dominates
the overall growth in the secrecy rate, if a certain number of
active antennas is surpassed. This means that by setting L to
be more than this given number, the quality improvement at
the eavesdropping terminal starts to exceed the enhancement
at the legitimate receiver. Considering Scenario B, similar
behavior can be observed in terms of ǫ-outage secrecy rate
ROut(ǫ). In Fig. 4 the ǫ-outage secrecy rate for ǫ = 0.01 has
been plotted in terms of L for several examples considering
M = 128, log ρm = 0 dB and log ρe = −10 dB.
A. Characterization of Secrecy Enhancement
Based on the latter observations, one may intuitively state
that TAS plays a constructive role on the secrecy performance
when the eavesdropping terminal starts to experience prevail-
ing improvements in its channel quality by growth in L at
some L < M . The characterization of the settings in which
this behavior is observed is however not trivial, since the per-
formance metrics in general depend on several parameters. In
the sequel, we invoke our large-system results to characterize
these settings. For this aim, we first define the “prevalence set”
for the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
Definition 2 (Prevalence Set): Let M(L) denote the secrecy
performance metric for L active transmit antennas. The legit-
imate receiver is said to be relatively prevailing, ifM(L) is a
monotonically increasing function of L. Moreover, the set of
all tuples (ρm, ρe, Nr, Ne) for which the legitimate receiver
is relatively prevailing is referred to as the prevalence set
for the legitimate receiver represented by SR. Similarly, the
eavesdropper is said to be relatively prevailing if
min
{
argmax
L∈{1,...,M}
M(L)
}
< M. (20)
PSfrag replacements
R O
u
t
(ǫ
)
L
Nr = 2, Ne = 4
Nr = 4, Ne = 4
Nr = 4, Ne = 2
20 8040 10060 120
0
10
15
5
20
Fig. 4: The ǫ-outage secrecy rate for ǫ = 0.01 versus L for M = 128,
log ρm = 0 dB and log ρe = −10 dB. The solid lines and the circles fol-
lowing each other closely are the approximation and numerical simulations,
respectively.
The prevalence set for the eavesdropper SE is then defined as
the set of all tuples (ρm, ρe, Nr, Ne) for which the eavesdrop-
per is relatively prevailing.
Definition 2 partitions the realizations of the setting into
two sets. In the former set, represented by SR, the growth in
the number of active antennas improves the communication
quality over the main channel always more than over the
eavesdropper channel. The latter set, denoted by SE, more-
over, encloses the settings in which the improvement at the
eavesdropper channel starts to prevail when L exceeds at some
L < M . Consequently, the secrecy performance in this case
is enhanced by employing the protocol S.
B. Sufficient Conditions for Prevalence
Using the large-system approximation, one can determine
SR and SE for largeM analytically. The result is however of
a complicated form in general. Alternatively, one may derive a
set of sufficient conditions for which the prevalence of the le-
gitimate or eavesdropping terminal is guaranteed. Theorem 2
gives a set of sufficient conditions for the legitimate receiver
to be relatively prevailing.
Theorem 2: Let the transmitter be equipped with M transmit
antennas and assume the asymmetrically asymptotic regime of
eavesdropping. For a given tuple T = (ρm, ρe, Nr, Ne), define
the fixed-point function f(·|T ) to be
f(ℓ|T ) := F (ℓ) + fR(ℓ|ρm, Nr)− fE(ℓ|ρe, Ne) (21)
where the function F (ℓ) reads
F (ℓ) =
ρmu Um
Um + ρmηt
(
1 + 2Λ(ℓ)
Um (Um − 1)
ρmηtVm
)
(22)
with u and ηt being defined in Theorem 1, Um = min {ℓ,Nr},
Vm = max {ℓ,Nr} and
Λ(ℓ) =
ψ
2
(
ρmηt
Um + ρmηt
)2
. (23)
Moreover, fR(ℓ|ρm, Nr) and fE(ℓ|ρe, Ne) are given by (25a)
and (25b) on the top of the next page with E(ℓ) reading
E(ℓ)=1− Um
Um+ρmηt
[
1−Λ(ℓ)Um+(2Um−1)ρmηt
UmVm
]
. (24)
Then, the legitimate receiver is relatively prevailing in both
Scenarios A and B if f(ℓ|T ) > 0 for all real ℓ ∈ [1,M ].
Proof: The proof follows bounding the first derivatives of the
large-system approximations for the ergodic and ǫ-outage se-
crecy rate by a similar term, and is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2 intuitively indicates that the legitimate receiver
is prevailing when the growth in the achievable rate over the
main channel by increasing the number of active antennas
always dominates the growth over the eavesdropper channel.
In fact, the first two terms in the right hand side of (21) bound
the rate growth over the main channel while fE(ℓ|ρe, Ne)
describes the improvement in the quality of the eavesdropper
channel in the large-system limit. Using Theorem 2, one can
discuss whether secrecy enhancement is achievable in the set-
ting via TAS or not. One should note that this theorem states
only a sufficient condition. This means that there exist tuples
which do not fulfill the conditions given in Theorem 2 and
still are optimal under full complexity in the sense of secrecy
performance. For these cases, one may further study necessary
conditions. In the following, we study some examples.
Example 1: Consider the following two scenarios:
(a) The legitimate and eavesdropping terminals are equipped
with Nr = 8 and Ne = 2 antennas, respectively and we
have log ρm = 0 dB, log ρe = −10 dB and M = 128.
(b) The eavesdropper is equipped with a single antenna while
Nr > 1. The number of transmit antennas unboundedly
grows large, i.e., M ↑ ∞.
From Theorem 2, one can show that for the setting in (a) the
sufficient conditions are satisfied, and thus, the legitimate re-
ceiver is relatively prevailing in both Scenarios A and B. This
result agrees with this intuition that the legitimate receiver is
prevailing, since both the number of receive antennas and the
SNR are relatively better at the this terminal.
For (b), we invoke Theorem 2 and derive a set of condi-
tions under which the legitimate receiver becomes relatively
prevailing. Since M ↑ ∞, one can show that for this case
Λ(ℓ) ≈ ψ/2 and E(ℓ) ≈ 1. Moreover, the function F (ℓ) in
the large-system limit can be approximated as
F (ℓ) ≈ u Um
Nrℓ+NrMfNr+1(u)
(26)
with u and fNr+1(u) given in Theorem 1. Substituting in (21),
the constraints in (27) at the top of the next page is derived.
WhenM ↑ ∞, one concludes thatNr ≥ 1+
√
2M is sufficient
for the prevalence of the legitimate receiver. Note that this co-
nstraint does not depend on the SNRs. For instance, consid-
ering M = 128, a legitimate terminal with Nr = 17 antennas
is relatively prevailing for any choice of ρm and ρe. Fig. 5
shows the achievable ergodic rate for M = 128, Ne = 1 and
Nr = 17 considering several choices of ρe and ρm. As the
figure depicts, the optimal choice for L in all the cases is
L⋆ =M which agrees with the analytic result.
V. OPTIMAL NUMBER OF ACTIVE ANTENNAS
When the eavesdropper is relatively prevailing, the secrecy
performance metric is maximized by choosing the number of
active antennas optimally. We investigate this problem through
some examples considering both Scenarios A and B.
A. Scenario A
The large-system approximation ofRErg (S) in (15) is a fu-
nction of L whose maxima occurs at some L⋆ ∈ [1 : M ] when
the eavesdropper is relatively prevailing. We derive this max-
ima analytically for some examples in the sequel.
Example 2 (Single-antenna receivers): Consider the scenario
in which the receiving terminals are equipped with a single
antenna, i.e., Nr = Ne = 1. Assume that the eavesdropper’s
CSI is available at the transmitter.
We intend to derive the optimal number of active antennas
L⋆ which maximizes RErg (S). To do so, we initially assume
that with L⋆ active transmit antennas the setting performs in
the asymmetrically asymptotic regime of eavesdropping, i.e.,
L⋆ ≫ 1. We later show that this prior assumption is true. By
substituting into (14a) and (14b), η and σ2 are determined as
η = log
(
1 + ρmL
(
1 + lnML−1
)
1 + ρeL
)
(28a)
σ2 =
[
ρ2m L
(
2− LM−1)
(1 + ρeL)
2
+
Lρ2e
(1 + ρeL)2
]
ψ2. (28b)
Under the assumption L⋆ ≫ 1, the achievable ergodic se-
crecy rate for M ↑ ∞ is further approximated as RErg (S) ≈
η. To find L⋆, we define the function
R(ℓ) := log
(
1 + ρmℓ+ ρmℓ lnMℓ
−1
1 + ρeℓ
)
(29)
for real ℓ. R(·) is the real envelope of the ergodic secrecy rate
whose values at integer points give the ergodic secrecy rate
for the given number of active antennas. In this case, one can
straightforwardly show that for any choice of ρm and ρe 6= 0,
there exists some real ℓ ∈ [1,M ] for which R′(ℓ) < 0. This
fact indicates that with Nr = Ne = 1, the eavesdropper is
relatively prevailing1 as long as ρe 6= 0, and thus, L⋆ < M . To
find L⋆, one notes thatR′′(ℓ) ≤ 0 for ℓ ∈ [0,M ], and thus, L⋆
is the closest integer to the maxima ofR(·). Consequently, the
optimal number of active transmit antennas is approximated
as L⋆ ≈ ⌊ℓ⋆⌉ where ℓ⋆ satisfies
ρeℓ
⋆ + ln ℓ⋆ +
ρe
ρm
= lnM. (30)
From (30), one observes that L⋆ grows with M , and there-
fore, the eavesdropping regime is asymmetrically asymptotic,
i.e., the initial assumption L⋆ ≫ 1 holds. Moreover, by
reducing ρe ↓ 0 in (30), L⋆ = M which agrees with the fact
that in the absence of eavesdroppers, the achievable ergodic
secrecy rate is a monotonically increasing function of L.
1Note that R′(ℓ) < 0 holds for large ℓ which agrees with the initial as-
sumption of being in the asymmetrically asymptotic regime of eavesdropping.
fR(ℓ|ρm, Nr) := 1 {ℓ < Nr}
[
log
(
1 +
ρmηt
ℓ
)
− E(ℓ)
]
+ 1 {ℓ > Nr} Nr(Nr − 1)Λ(ℓ)
ℓ2
, (25a)
fE(ℓ|ρe, Ne) := 1 {ℓ < Ne} log (1 + ρeNe) + 1 {ℓ > Ne} ρeNe
1 + ρeℓ
(25b)


uℓ
Nrℓ+NrMfNr+1(u)
+ log
(
1 +
ρmηt
ℓ
)
≥ 1 + ρe
1 + ρeℓ
ℓ < Nr
u
ℓ+MfNr+1(u)
+
Nr(Nr − 1)
2ℓ2
ψ ≥ ρe
1 + ρeℓ
ℓ > Nr.
(27)
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Fig. 5: The ergodic secrecy rate versus L for M = 128, Ne = 1 and
Nr = 17. The solid lines indicate the approximated ergodic secrecy rate and
the numerical simulations are plotted via the circles.
Fig. 6 shows the ergodic secrecy rate as a function of L for
log ρe = −10 dB and log ρm = 0 dB assuming thatM = 128
antennas are available at the transmit side. By solving the
fixed-point equation in (30), ℓ⋆ = 18.4 is obtained which
results in L⋆ = 18. This result is confirmed by numerical
simulations in Fig. 6.
Example 3 (Multi-antenna eavesdropper): Consider a sce-
nario with a single antenna legitimate receiver whose channel
is being overheard by a sophisticated multi-antenna terminal,
i.e., Nr = 1 and Ne growing large. Assume that the BS knows
the CSI of the eavesdropper.
From Theorem 1, η and σ2 are given by
η = log
(
1 + ρmL
(
1 + lnML−1
)
(1 + ρeNe)L
)
(31a)
σ2 =
ρ2mψ
2 L
(
2− LM−1)
(1 + ρeL)
2
+
ψ2
L
. (31b)
In contrast to Example 2, RErg (S) in this example can not
be approximated by η, since ξ = η/σ is not necessarily large.
Consequently, we employ (15) to accurately approximate the
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Fig. 6: RErg(S) in Example 2 in terms of L. The solid line and the circles
show the approximation given by (15) and numerical simulations respectively
for M = 128, log ρm = 0 dB and log ρe = −10 dB. As it is observed,
L⋆ = 18 is suggested by both the approximation and simulation results.
achievable ergodic rate. Define R(·) over the real axis as
R(ℓ) := s(ℓ)φ
(
f(ℓ)
s(ℓ)
)
+ f(x)Q
(
−f(ℓ)
s(ℓ)
)
(32)
where f(ℓ) and s(ℓ) are given by
f(ℓ) = log
(
1 + ρmℓ
(
1 + ln M
ℓ
)
(1 + ρeNe)ℓ
)
(33a)
s(ℓ) =
√
ρ2mψ
2 ℓ
(
2− ℓ
M
)
(1 + ρeℓ)
2
+
ψ2
ℓ
. (33b)
With similar lines of inference as in Example 2, one concludes
that for any non-zero choices of ρe and ρm the eavesdropper
is relatively prevailing. This result is intuitive, since the eaves-
dropper is more sophisticated compared to the one considered
in Example 2. Consequently, L⋆ ≈ ⌊ℓ⋆⌉ where ℓ⋆ satisfies1
1One may show that the fixed-point equation in (34) has always a solution
within the interval of [1,M ] which implies the fact that the eavesdropper is
relatively prevailing for any non-zero choices of ρe and ρm.
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Fig. 7: The ergodic secrecy rate in Example 3 versus L for M = 128,
Ne = 16, log ρm = 0 dB and log ρe = −25 dB. Both the approximation
and simulations, denoted respectively by the solid line and circles, suggest
L⋆ = 14.
h(ℓ⋆)φ (h(ℓ⋆))
f ′(ℓ⋆)s(ℓ⋆)− f(ℓ⋆)s′(ℓ⋆)
s(ℓ⋆)
=
1
2
f ′(ℓ⋆)Q (−h(ℓ⋆)) + 1
2
s′(ℓ⋆)φ (h(ℓ⋆)) . (34)
with h(ℓ) = f(ℓ)/s(ℓ). In Fig. 7, RErg(S) is sketched versus
L for Ne = 16 assuming log ρe = −25 dB, log ρm = 0 dB
and M = 128. From (34), the maxima of the function R(ℓ)
is derived as ℓ⋆ = 13.7 which recovers L⋆ = 14 given by
simulations.
B. Scenario B
Considering Scenario B, a similar approach can be taken to
derive the optimal number of active antennas. We investigate
this case through the following example.
Example 4 (Passive eavesdropping): Similar to Example 2,
consider a case with Nr = Ne = 1. Let ρe = ρm = ρ, and
assume that the eavesdropper’s CSI is not available at the BS.
The performance metric is the ǫ-outage secrecy rate which
in the large-system is approximated by (19) with η and σ
η = log
(
1 + ρL
(
1 + lnML−1
)
1 + ρL
)
(35a)
σ2 =
[
ρψ
1 + ρL
]2(
3− L
M
)
. (35b)
In order to investigate the prevalence, we define
R(ℓ):=log
(
1+ρℓ+ρℓlnMℓ−1
1 + ρℓ
)
+
ρψq0
1 + ρℓ
√
3− ℓ
M
(36)
where q0 = Q
−1 (1− ǫ). It is then trivial to show that
R′(ℓ) := ρln
(
Mℓ−1
)− ρ(1 + ρℓ)
(1 + ρℓ) (1 + ρℓ+ ρℓln (Mℓ−1))
− q0ρψ 6M − 2ℓ+ 1 + ρℓ
2 (1 + ρℓ)
2
√
3M2 − ℓM (37)
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first case ROut(0.1) is a decreasing function of L, while for log ρ = −15
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By standard lines of derivation, one can show that for any
choices of ρ, R′(M) < 0. This indicates that for all SNRs
the eavesdropper is relatively prevailing. Moreover, for
ρ > (1 + aǫ)lnM + aǫ − 1 (38)
with aǫ := −3q0ψ/
√
2, the outage secrecy rate is a decreasing
function of L, and therefore, L⋆ = 1. Nevertheless, when (38)
does not hold, the optimal number of active transmit antennas
antennas is given by1 L⋆ ≈ ⌊ℓ⋆⌉ where ℓ⋆ fulfills R′(ℓ⋆) = 0.
In Fig. 8, the ǫ-outage secrecy rate at ǫ = 0.1 for M = 128
has been plotted versus L for log ρ = −15 dB and log ρ =
15 dB. As the figure depicts, for the latter case, in which the
inequality in (38) is satisfied,ROut(ǫ) is a decreasing function
of L. For the case of log ρ = −15 dB, the simulations indicate
that L⋆ = 23. The analytic investigations moreover reports
ℓ⋆ = 22.97 which is consistent with the simulation results.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we characterized the impacts of TAS on the
secrecy performance of massive MIMO wiretap settings. It
was shown that in some scenarios, the secrecy performance is
enhanced under TAS compared to the case of full complexity.
We moreover developed an analytic framework to determine
the optimal number of active antennas in these scenarios. The
numerical investigations confirmed the accuracy of our frame-
work even for settings with not so large dimensions. The ana-
lyses of this study implies that antenna selection in some mas-
sive MIMO wiretap setups enhances the secrecy performance.
A possible direction for future work is to extend the current
framework to scenarios in which other techniques, such as art-
ificial noise generation, are employed along with TAS for sec-
recy enhancement. The work in this direction is ongoing.
1One should note that for L⋆ = 1, we have βe = 1, and therefore, this
approximation is not necessarily consistent. Nevertheless, as shown through
numerical investigations, the approximation is accurate even in this regime.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THEOREM 1
We start by evaluating the large-system distribution of Rm.
It has been shown in [28, Lemma 2] that the distribution
of the input-output mutual information of a Gaussian MIMO
channel, under some constraints, is accurately approximated
in terms of the random variables Tr{J} and Tr{J2} where
J := HHH. Under the TAS protocol S, Tr{J} represents
the sum of L first order statistics which at the large limit of
M converges in distribution to a Gaussian random variable
whose mean and variance are given by (10a) and (10b),
respectively. Using some properties of random matrices, the
large-system distribution of Rm is then approximated as in
[28, Theorem 1] with a Gaussian distribution whose mean
and variance are given in terms of ηt and σ
2
t . The next step is
to evaluate the distribution of Re. Noting that the main and
the eavesdropper channel are independent, it is concluded that
the TAS protocol S performs as a random selection protocol
from the eavesdropper’s point of view. By considering the
asymmetrically asymptotic regime of eavesdropping, one can
invoke the asymptotic results for i.i.d. Gaussian fading chan-
nels in [45], and approximate the large-system distribution of
Re is with a Gaussian distribution whose mean and variance
respectively read
ηe = Ue log (1 + ρeVe) (39a)
σ2e =
(
1{Ne>L}
Ue
Ve
+1{Ne<L}
UeVeρ
2
e
(1 + ρeVe)
2
)
ψ2. (39b)
Since the main and the eavesdropper channel are independent,
R⋆ = Rm−Re is sum of two independent Gaussian random
variables in the large-system limit; hence, it is Gaussian with
mean and variance given in (14a) and (14b).
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF THEOREM 2
In the large-system limit, the achievable ergodic and ǫ-out-
age secrecy rate are accurately approximated by (15) and (19),
respectively. To derive a sufficient condition, we first consider
Scenario A. We define the functionMA(·) on the real axis as
MA(ℓ) = s(ℓ)φ
(
f(ℓ)
s(ℓ)
)
+ f(ℓ)Q
(
−f(ℓ)
s(ℓ)
)
(40)
where f(ℓ) and s(ℓ) are determined by replacing L with ℓ
in the asymptotic terms given for η and σ in Theorem 1,
respectively. MA(ℓ) is the real envelope of the achievable
ergodic rate whose values at integer points within the interval
[1,M ] give RErg(S). It is therefore concluded that for the
set of T = (ρm, ρe, Nr, Ne) in whichMA(ℓ) is an increasing
function, the legitimate receiver is relatively prevailing. In this
case, a set of sufficient conditions are deduced by investigating
the set of tuples in which M′A(ℓ) > 0 for all ℓ ∈ [1,M ]. To
extend the result to Scenario B, one may similarly define
MP(ℓ) = f(ℓ)−Q−1 (ǫ) s(ℓ) (41)
and investigate a sufficient condition for which M′P(ℓ) > 0.
Lemma 1: Assume that f ′(ℓ) > 0 for ℓ ∈ [1,M ]. Then,
(a) s′(ℓ) ≈ 0 for ℓ < min {Ne, Nr}, and
(b) f(ℓ)/s(ℓ)≫ 1 for ℓ ∈ [1,M ].
Proof: Let f ′(ℓ) > 0. In this case, for ℓ < min {Ne, Nr}, one
can simply show that
Neρe <
Nrρmu
Nr + ρmηt
(1 + ρeℓ) (42)
where u and ηt are defined in Theorem 2. As we have assumed
an asymmetrically asymptotic regime of eavesdropping, the
number of eavesdropper antennas reads1 Ne ≫ ℓ when ℓ <
min {Ne, Nr}. This means that the inequality in (42) holds
only when u takes values close to zero. By taking the first
derivative of s(ℓ), it is then shown that for values of u close
to zero, s′(ℓ) ≈ 0 for ℓ < min {Ne, Nr} which concludes (a).
To prove (b), one may note that for ℓ > min {Ne, Nr} we
have s′(ℓ) < 0. This statement along with (a) depicts that
∂
∂ℓ
(
f(ℓ)
s(ℓ)
)
> 0 (43)
when f ′(ℓ) > 0. As f(1)/s(1) ≫ 1 for large M , one con-
cludes that f(ℓ)/s(ℓ)≫ 1 for ℓ ∈ [1,M ].
From Lemma 1, it is observed that f ′(ℓ) > 0 is a sufficient
condition in the asymptotic regime to have both M′A(ℓ) > 0
and M′P(ℓ) > 0. In fact by using Part (b) in Lemma 1, we
employ Q(−ξ) ≈ 1−φ(ξ)/ξ and write MA(ℓ) = f(ℓ) when
f ′(ℓ) > 0. This concludes the proof for Scenario A. Moreover,
M′P(ℓ) = h′(ℓ)−Q−1 (ǫ) s′(ℓ). (44)
Note that s′(ℓ) < 0 for ℓ ∈ [min {Ne, Nr} ,M ]. Hence, (44)
along with Part (a) in Lemma 1 implies that f ′(ℓ) > 0 is a
sufficient condition for Scenario B as well. Finally, by taking
the derivative of f ′(ℓ) and noting that ∂ηt/∂ℓ = u, the proof
is completed.
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